| slovo | definícia |
interpretation
(mass) | interpretation
- interpretácia, preklad |
interpretation
(encz) | interpretation,interpretace Pavel Machek; Giza |
interpretation
(encz) | interpretation,tlumočení n: Zdeněk Brož |
interpretation
(encz) | interpretation,výklad n: Zdeněk Brož |
Interpretation
(gcide) | Interpretation \In*ter`pre*ta"tion\
([i^]n*t[~e]r`pr[-e]*t[=a]"sh[u^]n), n. [L. interpretatio:
cf. F. interpr['e]tation.]
[1913 Webster]
1. The act of interpreting; explanation of what is obscure;
translation; version; construction; as, the interpretation
of a foreign language, of a dream, or of an enigma.
[1913 Webster]
Look how we can, or sad or merrily,
Interpretation will misquote our looks. --Shak.
[1913 Webster]
2. The sense given by an interpreter; exposition or
explanation given; meaning; as, commentators give various
interpretations of the same passage of Scripture.
[1913 Webster]
3. The power or explaining. [R.] --Bacon.
[1913 Webster]
4. (Fine Arts) An artist's way of expressing his thought or
embodying his conception of nature.
[1913 Webster]
5. (Math.) The act or process of applying general principles
or formul[ae] to the explanation of the results obtained
in special cases.
Syn: Explanation; solution; translation; version; sense;
exposition; rendering; definition.
[1913 Webster] |
interpretation
(wn) | interpretation
n 1: a mental representation of the meaning or significance of
something [syn: interpretation, reading, version]
2: the act of interpreting something as expressed in an artistic
performance; "her rendition of Milton's verse was
extraordinarily moving" [syn: rendition, rendering,
interpretation]
3: an explanation that results from interpreting something; "the
report included his interpretation of the forensic evidence"
4: an explanation of something that is not immediately obvious;
"the edict was subject to many interpretations"; "he annoyed
us with his interpreting of parables"; "often imitations are
extended to provide a more accurate rendition of the child's
intended meaning" [syn: interpretation, interpreting,
rendition, rendering] |
INTERPRETATION
(bouvier) | INTERPRETATION. The explication of a law, agreement, will, or other
instrument, which appears obscure or ambiguous.
2. The object of interpretation is to find out or collect the intention
of the maker of the instrument, either from his own words, or from other
conjectures, or both. It may then be divided into three sorts, according to
the different means it makes use of for obtaining its end.
3. These three sorts of interpretations are either literal, rational,
or mixed. When we collect the intention of the writer from his words only,
as they lie before us, this is a literal interpretation. When his words do
not express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it, or fall short of
it, so that we are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only,
this is rational interpretation and when his words, though they do express
his intention, when rightly understood, are in themselves. of doubtful
meaning, and we are forced to have recourse to like conjectures to find out
in what sense he used them this sort of interpretation is mixed; it is
partly literal, and partly rational.
4. According to the civilians there are three sorts of interpretations,
the authentic, the usual, and the doctrinal.
5.-1. The authentic interpretation is that which refers to the
legislator himself, in order to fix the sense of the law.
6.-2. When the judge interprets the law so as to accord with prior
decisions, the interpretation is called usual.
7.-3. It is doctrinal when it is made agreeably to rules of science.
The Commentaries of learned lawyers in this case furnish the greatest
assistance. This last kind of interpretation is itself divided into, three
distinct classes. Doctrinal interpretation is extensive, restrictive, or
declaratory. 1st. It is extensive whenever the reason of the law has a more
enlarged sense than its terms, and it is consequently applied to a case
which had not been explained. 2d. On the contrary, it is restrictive when
the expressions of the law have a greater latitude than its reasons, so that
by a restricted interpretation, an exception is made in a case which the law
does not seem to have embraced. 3d. When the reason of the law and the terms
in which it is conceived agree, and it is only necessary to explain them to
have the sense complete, the interpretation is declaratory. 8. The term
interpretation is used by foreign jurists in nearly the same sense that we
use the word construction. (q. v.)
9. Pothier, in his excellent treatise on Obligations, lays down the
following rules for the interpretation of contracts:
10.-1. We ought to examine what was the common, intention of the
contracting parties rather than the grammatical sense of the terms.
11.-2. When a clause is capable of two significations, it should be
understood in that which will have some operation rather than, that in which
it will have none.
12.-3. Where the terms of a contract are capable of two
significations, we ought to understand them in the sense which is most
agreeable to the nature of the contract.
13.-4. Any thing, which may appear ambiguous in the terms of a
contract, may be explained by the common use of those terms in the country
where it is made.
14.-5. Usage is of so much authority in the interpretation of
agreements, that a contract is understood to contain the customary clauses
although they are not expressed; in contractibus tacite veniunt ea quae sunt
moris et consuetudinis.
15.-6. We ought to interpret one clause by the others contained in the
same act, whether they precede or follow it.
16.-7. In case of doubt, a clause ought to be interpreted against the
person who stipulates anything, and in discharge of the person who contracts
the obligation.
17.-8. However general the terms may be in which an agreement is
conceived, it only comprises those things respecting which it appears that
the contracting parties proposed to contract, and not others which they
never thought of.
18.-9. When the object of the agreement is to include universally
everything of a given nature, (une universalite de choses) the general
description will comprise all particular articles, although they may not
have been in the knowledge, of the parties. We may state, as an example of
this rule, an engagement which I make with you to abandon my share in a
succession for a certain sum. This agreement includes everything which makes
part of the succession, whether known or not; our intention was to contract
for the whole. Therefore it is decided, that I cannot object to the
agreement, under pretence that considerable property has been found to
belong to the succession of which we had not any knowledge.
19.-10. When a case is expressed in a contract on account of any doubt
which there may be whether the engagement resulting from the contract would.
extend to such case, the parties are not thereby understood to restrain the
extent which the engagement has of right, in respect to all cases not
expressed.
20.-11. In contracts as well as in testaments, a clause conceived in
the plural may be frequently distributed into several particular classes.
21.-12. That which is at the end of a phrase commonly refers to the
whole phrase, and not only to that which immediately precedes it, provided
it agrees in gender and number with the whole phrase.
22. For instance, if in the contract for sale of a farm, it is said to
be sold with all the corn, small grain, fruits and wine that have been got
this year, the terms, that have been got this year, refer to the whole
phrase, and not to the wine only, and consequently the old corn is not less
excepted than the old wine; it would be otherwise if it had been said, all
the wine that has been got this year, for the expression is in the singular,
and only refers to the wine and not to the rest of the phrase, with which it
does not agree in number. Vide 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 86, et seq.
|
| | podobné slovo | definícia |
committee on interpretation
(encz) | Committee on Interpretation, |
interpretation services
(encz) | Interpretation Services, |
interpretational
(encz) | interpretational,vysvětlující adj: Zdeněk Brož |
interpretations
(encz) | interpretations,interpretace pl. Zdeněk Brož |
life cycle interpretation
(encz) | life cycle interpretation,interpretace hodnocení životního
cyklu [eko.] Fáze posuzování životního cyklu, ve které jsou poznatky buď
z inventarizační analýzy nebo z hodnocení dopadů či z obou porovnány s
definovaným cílem a rozsahem tak, aby bylo dosaženo závěrů a
doporučení. RNDr. Pavel Piskačlife cycle interpretation,výklad životního cyklu [eko.] RNDr. Pavel
Piskač |
literal interpretation
(encz) | literal interpretation, n: |
misinterpretation
(encz) | misinterpretation,nesprávný výklad Zdeněk Brož |
reinterpretation
(encz) | reinterpretation,přehodnocení n: Zdeněk Brož |
Interpretation
(gcide) | Interpretation \In*ter`pre*ta"tion\
([i^]n*t[~e]r`pr[-e]*t[=a]"sh[u^]n), n. [L. interpretatio:
cf. F. interpr['e]tation.]
[1913 Webster]
1. The act of interpreting; explanation of what is obscure;
translation; version; construction; as, the interpretation
of a foreign language, of a dream, or of an enigma.
[1913 Webster]
Look how we can, or sad or merrily,
Interpretation will misquote our looks. --Shak.
[1913 Webster]
2. The sense given by an interpreter; exposition or
explanation given; meaning; as, commentators give various
interpretations of the same passage of Scripture.
[1913 Webster]
3. The power or explaining. [R.] --Bacon.
[1913 Webster]
4. (Fine Arts) An artist's way of expressing his thought or
embodying his conception of nature.
[1913 Webster]
5. (Math.) The act or process of applying general principles
or formul[ae] to the explanation of the results obtained
in special cases.
Syn: Explanation; solution; translation; version; sense;
exposition; rendering; definition.
[1913 Webster] |
Misinterpretation
(gcide) | Misinterpretation \Mis`in*ter"pre*ta"tion\, n.
The act of interpreting erroneously; a mistaken
interpretation.
[1913 Webster] |
broad interpretation
(wn) | broad interpretation
n 1: an interpretation of the U.S. constitution holding that the
spirit of the times and the needs of the nation can
legitimately influence judicial decisions (particularly
decisions of the Supreme Court) [syn: {broad
interpretation}, judicial activism] |
literal interpretation
(wn) | literal interpretation
n 1: an interpretation based on the exact wording |
misinterpretation
(wn) | misinterpretation
n 1: putting the wrong interpretation on; "his misinterpretation
of the question caused his error"; "there was no mistaking
her meaning" [syn: misinterpretation, misunderstanding,
mistaking] |
reinterpretation
(wn) | reinterpretation
n 1: a new or different meaning
2: a new or different interpretation |
abstract interpretation
(foldoc) | abstract interpretation
A partial execution of a program which gains
information about its semantics (e.g. control structure,
flow of information) without performing all the calculations.
Abstract interpretation is typically used by compilers to
analyse programs in order to decide whether certain
optimisations or transformations are applicable.
The objects manipulated by the program (typically values and
functions) are represented by points in some domain. Each
abstract domain point represents some set of real
("concrete") values.
For example, we may take the abstract points "+", "0" and "-"
to represent positive, zero and negative numbers and then
define an abstract version of the multiplication operator, *#,
which operates on abstract values:
*# | + 0 -
---|------
+ | + 0 -
0 | 0 0 0
- | - 0 +
An interpretation is "safe" if the result of the abstract
operation is a safe approximation to the abstraction of the
concrete result. The meaning of "a safe approximation"
depends on how we are using the results of the analysis.
If, in our example, we assume that smaller values are safer
then the "safety condition" for our interpretation (#) is
a# *# b# |
standard interpretation
(foldoc) | standard semantics
standard interpretation
The standard interpretation of a term in some language yields
the term's standard denotational semantics, i.e. its "meaning".
This is usually given by a semantic function which maps a term
in the abstract syntax to a point in some domain. The domain
is the interpretation of the term's type. The semantic
function also takes an environment - a function which maps the
free variables of the term to their meaning. We say that a
domain point "denotes", or "is the denotation of", a term. A
non-standard semantics results from some other interpretation,
e.g. an abstract interpretation.
|
INTERPRETATION
(bouvier) | INTERPRETATION. The explication of a law, agreement, will, or other
instrument, which appears obscure or ambiguous.
2. The object of interpretation is to find out or collect the intention
of the maker of the instrument, either from his own words, or from other
conjectures, or both. It may then be divided into three sorts, according to
the different means it makes use of for obtaining its end.
3. These three sorts of interpretations are either literal, rational,
or mixed. When we collect the intention of the writer from his words only,
as they lie before us, this is a literal interpretation. When his words do
not express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it, or fall short of
it, so that we are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only,
this is rational interpretation and when his words, though they do express
his intention, when rightly understood, are in themselves. of doubtful
meaning, and we are forced to have recourse to like conjectures to find out
in what sense he used them this sort of interpretation is mixed; it is
partly literal, and partly rational.
4. According to the civilians there are three sorts of interpretations,
the authentic, the usual, and the doctrinal.
5.-1. The authentic interpretation is that which refers to the
legislator himself, in order to fix the sense of the law.
6.-2. When the judge interprets the law so as to accord with prior
decisions, the interpretation is called usual.
7.-3. It is doctrinal when it is made agreeably to rules of science.
The Commentaries of learned lawyers in this case furnish the greatest
assistance. This last kind of interpretation is itself divided into, three
distinct classes. Doctrinal interpretation is extensive, restrictive, or
declaratory. 1st. It is extensive whenever the reason of the law has a more
enlarged sense than its terms, and it is consequently applied to a case
which had not been explained. 2d. On the contrary, it is restrictive when
the expressions of the law have a greater latitude than its reasons, so that
by a restricted interpretation, an exception is made in a case which the law
does not seem to have embraced. 3d. When the reason of the law and the terms
in which it is conceived agree, and it is only necessary to explain them to
have the sense complete, the interpretation is declaratory. 8. The term
interpretation is used by foreign jurists in nearly the same sense that we
use the word construction. (q. v.)
9. Pothier, in his excellent treatise on Obligations, lays down the
following rules for the interpretation of contracts:
10.-1. We ought to examine what was the common, intention of the
contracting parties rather than the grammatical sense of the terms.
11.-2. When a clause is capable of two significations, it should be
understood in that which will have some operation rather than, that in which
it will have none.
12.-3. Where the terms of a contract are capable of two
significations, we ought to understand them in the sense which is most
agreeable to the nature of the contract.
13.-4. Any thing, which may appear ambiguous in the terms of a
contract, may be explained by the common use of those terms in the country
where it is made.
14.-5. Usage is of so much authority in the interpretation of
agreements, that a contract is understood to contain the customary clauses
although they are not expressed; in contractibus tacite veniunt ea quae sunt
moris et consuetudinis.
15.-6. We ought to interpret one clause by the others contained in the
same act, whether they precede or follow it.
16.-7. In case of doubt, a clause ought to be interpreted against the
person who stipulates anything, and in discharge of the person who contracts
the obligation.
17.-8. However general the terms may be in which an agreement is
conceived, it only comprises those things respecting which it appears that
the contracting parties proposed to contract, and not others which they
never thought of.
18.-9. When the object of the agreement is to include universally
everything of a given nature, (une universalite de choses) the general
description will comprise all particular articles, although they may not
have been in the knowledge, of the parties. We may state, as an example of
this rule, an engagement which I make with you to abandon my share in a
succession for a certain sum. This agreement includes everything which makes
part of the succession, whether known or not; our intention was to contract
for the whole. Therefore it is decided, that I cannot object to the
agreement, under pretence that considerable property has been found to
belong to the succession of which we had not any knowledge.
19.-10. When a case is expressed in a contract on account of any doubt
which there may be whether the engagement resulting from the contract would.
extend to such case, the parties are not thereby understood to restrain the
extent which the engagement has of right, in respect to all cases not
expressed.
20.-11. In contracts as well as in testaments, a clause conceived in
the plural may be frequently distributed into several particular classes.
21.-12. That which is at the end of a phrase commonly refers to the
whole phrase, and not only to that which immediately precedes it, provided
it agrees in gender and number with the whole phrase.
22. For instance, if in the contract for sale of a farm, it is said to
be sold with all the corn, small grain, fruits and wine that have been got
this year, the terms, that have been got this year, refer to the whole
phrase, and not to the wine only, and consequently the old corn is not less
excepted than the old wine; it would be otherwise if it had been said, all
the wine that has been got this year, for the expression is in the singular,
and only refers to the wine and not to the rest of the phrase, with which it
does not agree in number. Vide 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 86, et seq.
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